

GAZA RECONSTRUCTION PLANS

Even before October 2023, there were many significant plans for Gaza. Given the scale of destruction there have been many more reconstruction plans elaborated since, even given immense levels of uncertainty. This briefing analyses some 34 of those, developed by Palestinian institutions, international organisations, civil society groups, policy centres and private actors. Many have Palestinian agency, most don't. Exact details of each plan, referenced with a number, are catalogued in the online annexe. They differ greatly in scope, scale, and emphasis. Some look to Egypt, some to the West Bank; some emergency stabilisation, others intermediate recovery. This is how Gaza's potential future has been framed and prioritised.




Figure 1: Different Spatial Approaches

Housing and Urban Form

Across the plans, this is one of the clearest fault lines: repair versus redesign; neighbourhood continuity versus master-planned reordering; community return versus corridor-based economic integration; incremental rebuild versus speculative redevelopment. Housing is an expression of visions of sovereignty, economy, governance and control. Some, such as UNDP (1), Gaza Recovery (2) and Gaza Phoenix (3) are restorative models, seeking to repair and rebuild existing neighbourhoods. These often use area-based or



neighbourhood approaches, prioritising debris removal, phased reconstruction and returning to original sites. This makes urban form largely continuous with pre-war Gaza, upgrading for resilience and infrastructure integration, with no wholesale redesign. Others are structured redevelopment plans, framing reconstruction as an opportunity to change density, introduce vertical growth, integrate mixed-use districts or align housing with economic corridors and infrastructure. These include RAND (4), Palestine Emerging (5), Anthedon (6) and Connected Gaza (7). Here, housing is not merely shelter but a lever to improve the spatial order with planned districts, transit-oriented development or sustainability-led reconfiguration. The third set are transformative or investment-driven visions. These involve a more fundamental frontier redevelopment, including MIND (8), the Board of Peace (9) and the earlier Peace to Prosperity (10), together proposing master-planned waterfronts, new residential complexes, tourism zones or entirely restructured urban grids, with housing embedded in spatial transformation.




Figure 2:
Comparative
Housing Scenarios
Source: RAND (4)

Many plans, such as the Wilson Centre (11) and Day After (29) acknowledge housing destruction but do not meaningfully engage with urban form.

UNDP (1) sees housing primarily as shelter, envisaging phased repair within the existing urban footprint and transitional arrangements without redesigning Gaza's spatial structure. Gaza Neighbourhood (13) and UN-Habitat (14) engage more directly with urban form, prioritising neighbourhoods and proposing area-based sequencing and phased reconstruction. RAND (4) is one of the most spatially-detailed, with redevelopment of heavily-damaged areas, including vertical growth, new neighbourhoods and interim settlement models, whereas their earlier Arc (15) focuses on a stronger infrastructure spine.

Palestine Emerging (5), Anthedon (6), Al Habtoor (16), Connected Gaza (7) and others centre housing less, with parameters set more on redevelopment masterplans with new districts and waterfronts, vertical residential towers and economic corridors, prioritising spatial restructuring rather than incremental neighbourhood repair.

Immediate Term	Default scenario		Preferred scenario	
	km ²	% of IDP housed	km ²	% of IDP housed
Camps				
Conventional	13	22%	11	17%
Informal	16	93%	16	89%
Future-oriented camps - incremental urbanism	2	3%	8	9%
Urban zones				
City edge - incremental urbanism	2	3.5%	4	6%
City core - incremental urbanism	1	3.5%	2	5%
City edge - razed and rebuilt	1	7%	1	0%
City core - razed and rebuilt	1	0%	1	0%
New neighbourhood				
Sustainable/disconnected locations	2	0%	2	0%



Both Phoenix plans (3, 17) emphasise localised, participatory and sustainability-driven rebuilding within existing communities over radical redesign, whilst Al-Shabaka (18) addresses housing as a rights and tenure issue. New Horizon (19) suggests partial spatial reorganisation and improved zoning. Both the Gaza Recovery (2) and Arab League (21) plans envisage the centralised coordination of large-scale housing rebuilding, reject displacement and do not radically reconfigure Gaza’s urban map.

Transport and Connectivity

Connectivity is where the proposals disclose their underlying map of Gaza: enclave, corridor, gateway or hub. The more connectivity is part of global infrastructure, the less everyday mobility, displacement and neighbourhood-level access is grappled with, so it is internal mobility restoration versus territorial reconfiguration. On one side is road clearance to restore basic internal mobility; at the other, ambitious regional corridor visions. The former includes UNDP (1), the UNCT (22), Gaza Neighbourhood (13); UN-Habitat (14) and the PA (2), reopening old roads and networks so aid and services flow quicker to displaced residents. Connectivity here is functional stabilisation, restoring arteries, repairing bridges, enhancing access to essential facilities. RAND (4) goes further, integrating transport into neighbourhood restructuring, with stronger street hierarchies and structured corridors in redeveloped areas. Transit planning is incorporated into new or interim settlement layouts to avoid typical congestion. The two Phoenix plans (3, 17) use rehabilitated road networks with improved accessibility by design, e.g. for amputees and the disabled; while Al-Shabaka (18) works in relation to freedom of movement. These see connectivity at community-level.



At the other end of the spectrum to post-war road repair, the Arc (15) is geopolitical corridor-building with its ambitious macro-scale connectivity of an elevated infrastructure spine linking Gaza and the West Bank, echoed in Palestine Emerging (5), Connected Gaza (7), FutureGaza (23), MIND (8), Al Habtoor (16) and Anthedon (6). These embed transport within large-scale economic redevelopment, including port expansion, logistics hubs, waterfront redevelopment, an airport and integrated transport corridors. Connectivity here is an economic growth enabler, emphasising trade routes, exports and global integration. BOT (24) frames transport around utilities, the Arab League (21) around regional oversight, and Mitvim (25) dependent on security arrangements. None of these have detailed urban transport designs. The Board of Peace (9) assumes extensive modernisation of ports, roads and an airport to support tourism and economic development, again with connectivity conceived as integration into global markets rather than restoration. Importantly, heavy infrastructure and thus also population are reorientated here to the South and towards Egypt, a stark comparison to most others where the proximity is in the North, and so towards Israel and the West Bank, exposing a different integration philosophy and context.

Water and Sanitation

The plans address water and sanitation with varying depth and three approaches: restoration of existing systems, capital-intensive modernisation tied to redevelopment and sustainability-oriented redesign. The UNCT (22), PA (2), UNDP (1) and Gaza Neighbourhood (13) focus on restoring damaged networks, rehabilitating desalination plants and wastewater facilities, repairing trunk lines, preventing sewage overflow and reactivating minimum service levels, so displaced populations can return, thereby prioritising access over structural redesign. A second cluster, including Palestine Emerging (5), Connected Gaza (7), FutureGaza (23), GREAT (26) and the Arab League (21) instead favour comprehensive modernisation as part of an integrated masterplan, and so entail expanded desalination capacity, new treatment plants and integrated utility corridors, aligned with economic zones and redesigned urban districts. BOT (24) specifically advances privately-financed desalination and wastewater projects, as its name suggests under a build, operate and transfer model. Al-Shabaka (18) highlights aquifer protection, and a few plans, including Phoenix (3) and Green Vision (27) give more emphasis to decentralised, renewable-powered desalination, wastewater reuse and circular systems.

Energy Infrastructure

Energy has three competing logics: service-restoration with reconstruction layered on, as for the PA (2); investment-grade modernisation, with power distribution rebuilt to enable master-planned development, like BOT (24); and where energy is not just infrastructure but a lever of sovereignty, such as Palestine Emerging (5). The important differences are not solar versus gas, but whether energy is humanitarian minimum, investment enabler or a governance control project. The first logic starts with power as a lifeline for hospitals, water and basic habitability, so sequenced repairs and stopgap reactivation, with later reconstruction a planned pipeline from emergency power to managed grid. Investment-grade modernisation has utility corridors for new districts, larger systems sized for growth and infrastructure packaged to reassure capital. The resilience-based third logic has a

distributed grid and gas strategy or else its green equivalent of decentralised renewables and storage, where energy is not just infrastructure but determines dependency, affordability and who controls the pace of recovery. UNCT (22) is explicit that early recovery includes relief to energy infrastructures, though at minimum service level restoration conditions and enablement, with no power blueprint. UN-Habitat (14) treats power as part of broader area-based recovery, so recommissioning alongside its housing and infrastructure sequencing with no distinctive generation strategy.

RAND (4) treats energy as a design condition for rebuilt areas: interim settlements and redevelopment zones are planned with reliable electricity corridors and service layouts from day one, so “temporary” areas don’t become long-term energy-poor camps. RAND’s earlier Arc (15) is macro-territorial, with integrated infrastructure along a corridor and strong connectivity between nodes: energy is part of state-building spatial framework, not rebuild.




Figure 4: Infrastructure Strategy, Prioritising Gas, Grid and Desalination
Source: Palestine Emerging (5)

Palestine Emerging (5) is explicit in its energy system design, framing reconstruction around Gas for Gaza, grid rebuilding and a distributed renewables model such as neighbourhood energy nodes or a virtual power plant, with renewables positioned to lower costs and diversify supply. Anhedon (6) and Al Habtoor (16) assume full modernisation, with energy as an enabling utility for high-end waterfront, tourism and real estate redevelopment, not based on previous access. Connected Gaza (7) also treats energy through a modernisation lens, with system upgrades to support connected economic clustering.

BOT (24) is the most delivery mechanism-oriented, with energy and linked utilities as bankable infrastructure packages, built to maximise the chances of financing rather than restoration. Phoenix (17) has a decentralised resilience story, of renewable-powered local systems, self-sufficiency, and recovery designs that reduce dependence on fragile networks.



Green Vision (27) too is an overt energy transition voice, treating Gaza’s reconstruction as a chance to hardwire in renewables, efficiency and low-carbon systems. Gaza Phoenix (3) treats energy as essential enabling infrastructure for return, so restoring both generation and import capacity where possible, stabilising distribution. New Horizon (19) uses the language of modernising the networks for upgraded services across reorganised districts but has no distinctive energy model. MDLF (20) focuses on municipal operational capacity and service restoration but also recognises the institutional and maintenance need to keep networks functioning. The PA (2) is the most programmatic and project list-oriented, with a wide energy portfolio including emergency generators and fuel, mobile kits for shelters, hybrid and battery storage for critical and heavier reconstruction such as grid rehabilitation and a new gas turbine plant. For the Arab League (21), energy is part of its state-led, donor-backed infrastructure rebuild, restoring and upgrading major assets including power and logistics as a prerequisite for recovery, without reimagining energy governance.

Economic Development


Economics is key to Gaza’s future, and where the proposals diverge most in revealing what they think Gaza is for. A first set, such as UNDP (1), focus on livelihoods and stability, with humanitarian recovery tools, cash for work, small enterprise support and restoring access to basic market functions and services. A second set, including the PA (2), see economic growth driving reconstruction, through large public works, state coordination and private sector revival, generating employment and restoring productive capacity. Others are explicitly based on redevelopment, with Gaza an investable platform for tourism, real estate and master-planned zones. This includes the Board of Peace (9) and earlier Peace to Prosperity (10) plans, GREAT (26), Al Habtoor (16) and FutureGaza (23). Finally, a smaller number comprising Palestine Emerging (5), Phoenix (17), Green Vision (27) and Al-Shabaka (18) treat economic development as structural autonomy: rebuilding productive sectors, reducing dependency and anchoring recovery in locally-controlled labour, materials, and institutions. Thus the range of choices is not mainly about which sectors, but whether recovery builds a subsistence economy, a public-works economy, an investment economy or an autonomous economy.

PROPOSALS	STRATEGY
UNDP (1) <i>Livelihood stabilisation</i>	<i>Reopen markets, restore livelihoods, cash-for-work, small enterprise support during infrastructure repair.</i>
Green Vision (27) <i>Green growth transformation</i>	<i>Green transition as economic engine; renewables, climate adaptation, sustainability-driven jobs.</i>
Gaza Phoenix Plan (17) <i>Decentralised circular economy</i>	<i>Circular economy: rubble recycling, local materials, green jobs, reconstruction as labour absorption.</i>
BOT (24) <i>Infrastructure-for-return investment model</i>	<i>Revenue-generating infrastructure under concessions to jump-start economic activity.</i>
Gaza Phoenix (3) <i>Reconstruction-led local employment economy</i>	<i>Reconstruction as a jobs engine. Rebuilding housing and infrastructure becomes a labour-absorbing process anchored in local contractors, municipal institutions, and civil society.</i>
Gaza Recovery (2) <i>Reconstruction-led growth</i>	<i>Large capital works + employment generation + private sector revival under centralised coordination.</i>
Palestine Emerging (5) <i>Productive sector rebuilding</i>	<i>Build productive sectors (construction, agriculture, energy), cooperative labour, diaspora investment, reduce dependency.</i>

Figure 5: Economic Strategies for Gaza

UNDP (1) frames economic recovery as a servant of rapid stabilisation: services, reopening markets, restoring livelihoods and supporting SMEs to keep households afloat as infrastructure is repaired. Gaza Neighbourhood (13) is similar, but livelihoods are part of wider localised packages and so local employment, small commerce and basic services restart at neighbourhood level. The UNCT (22) emphasis is on restoring economic functionality through emergency employment to reactivate critical services and enable basic production and distribution, linked to infrastructure repair, but just at programme level rather than as an economic model. UN-Habitat (14) links economic recovery to settlement rehabilitation; so housing and infrastructure repair is the condition for markets, services, and local commerce to resume, again. RAND (4) relates the economy to its interim settlement plans: if Gazans are going to live years in transitional neighbourhoods, those places must support jobs and commerce, not just be shelter and services. Palestine Emerging (5) is one of the most economically explicit and transformative, shifting away from dependency by building a productive economy rooted in local industry, marked by construction, agriculture and energy, with a cooperative labour model, diaspora linkages and regional trade integration.

Figure 6: Gaza Employment Projection with Growth Scenario
Source: Palestine Emerging (5)



Reconstruction here is about political economy not a list of projects. Connected Gaza (7) also treats Gaza as an economic node, emphasising private sector mobilisation, infrastructure-led growth, and trade, logistics and digital connectivity, so Gaza can reinsert itself into regional and global markets. Anthedon (6) is catalytic geography, with the port and heritage waterfront an economic engine for logistics, tourism and culture with wider economic spillover.

Al Habtoor (16) is investment-led, with GDP growth through real estate, hospitality and high-end commercial development. Gaza is a new market frontier, oriented to external capital rather than local productive sectors. BOT (24) is even more finance-engineered, rebuilding Gaza through concessions and revenue-generating infrastructure packages. This jump-starts the economy through large bankable projects and private operations.

By contrast, Phoenix (17) sees the economy as local and circular, with rubble recycled into building materials, localised production and green jobs. Reconstruction is designed as a labour-absorbing process to rebuild institutions and social welfare alongside markets. Green Vision (27) is similar, with green growth at the centre. Energy transition, sustainable infrastructure, and climate adaptation are framed as economic strategy: creating jobs, innovation and long-term competitiveness through environmental modernisation. Gaza Phoenix (3) links economic development to local agency and labour: rebuilding housing and infrastructure is a jobs engine, based on local capacity and avoiding external contracting models. MERI (28), whilst not an economic plan, argues that restoring municipal machinery is a precondition for economic activity, for example organising rubble clearance leads to road

access, service restoration then markets. Al-Shabaka (18) sees the economy as a rights question: it is wary of donor-driven “recovery” that reproduces dependency, so wants reconstruction to address constraints, sovereignty, and long-term viability not investment criteria. For the Day After (29), economic recovery is a phased process tied to governance and (re)building institutions. New Horizon (19) is a moderniser: rebuilding infrastructure, reorganising districts and improving efficiency. MDLF (20) is municipal: the economy is downstream from restoring municipal services and basic urban functionality.

The PA (2) is the most programme-bundled and Keynesian. It links reconstruction to macro-economic recovery through large capital works, employment generation, support for private sector revival and a financing framework that mobilises donors and coordinates investment across sectors. The Arab League (21) is similar, with a regional as well as statist lens. Growth from large public works like the port help restore regional integration.

Peace to Prosperity (10) has the most explicit use of economic vision as geopolitics, proposing large investment packages, industrial zones, infrastructure corridors and private sector-led growth, all tied to regional integration and donor/investor mobilisation. GREAT (26) is similar, with structured vehicles and large flagship projects. For FutureGaza (23) the economy is master-planned clusters and restructured urban nodes to attract investment, thereby reorganising economic geography. MIND (8) does this too, seeing the post-war moment as an opportunity for an economic and spatial reset. The Board of Peace (9) is the most overtly tourism and real-estate led, through coastal redevelopment, leisure investment and high-end urbanism: the economy as a redevelopment market.

Healthcare and Education

Healthcare and education are treated with uneven depth. They are most substantiated by the UNCT (22), PA (2) and Gaza Neighbourhood (13) linked to facility restoration, return and institutional rebuilding and schools and health centres anchor institutions. Indeed they are determinants of whether a neighbourhood is viable for return. UNDP (1) also prioritises restoring damaged clinics, hospitals, and schools to minimal operational status and supporting temporary facilities for essential service delivery. In many plans, social infrastructure is just a downstream outcome of stability or investment. For the PA (2) they are critical humanitarian sectors that require rapid rehabilitation, supply chains and staffing. For UN-Habitat (14) school and clinic restoration are similarly integral to neighbourhood rebuild. RAND (4) has planned schools and health centres in its interim settlements, to avoid reproducing camp conditions marked by service shortages.

Gaza Phoenix (3) strongly centres healthcare and education as pillars of dignified return, proposing rehabilitation of clinics, trauma-informed services and restoration of schools within neighbourhood reconstruction. Rebuilding Gaza (30) addresses social infrastructure conceptually, emphasising rights-based access and warning against donor-driven fragmentation of services, and New Horizon (19) proposes the modernisation of schools and hospitals in its reorganised districts. The focus of MDLF (31) is restoring municipal service capacity, which in turn enables schools and clinics to function. The PA (2) has again the most programmatic articulation, outlining large-scale rehabilitation and expansion of hospitals, primary care centres and educational facilities through centralised coordination.



As would be expected, the regional plans such as Arab League (21) and FutureGaza (23), have less detail on social infrastructure, upgrading facilities and incorporating them into master-planned urban districts. Very few engage with the social and psychological dimensions of recovery, even though the scale of displacement, bereavement, injury and prolonged insecurity means any Gaza reconstruction will unfold in a deeply traumatised social landscape. Rebuilding will not take place in an empty urban fabric, but within communities experiencing grief, loss, and social fragmentation. Yet social processes to rebuild trust, restore collective life, and process trauma are an underdeveloped dimension of reconstruction planning. Where community restoration is addressed, it tends to be through neighbourhood-based rebuilding, or trauma-informed service provision rather than a fully-articulated reconstruction strategy. Yet long-term stability depends as much on communities rebuilding social trust and the restoration of institutional legitimacy as on the restoration of infrastructure. Psychosocial recovery appears with health and education in the institutional and humanitarian cluster of plans, with early recovery frameworks referencing mental health and psychosocial support, where trauma-informed schooling is embedded in humanitarian service delivery. Schools and clinics are sites where psychosocial services can be delivered, but no proposals detail how urban reconstruction itself can foster social repair through public space, community facilities or neighbourhood-based rebuilding.

0 = No engagement 1 = Acknowledged but underdeveloped 2 = Moderate sector engagement 3 = Substantive, structured, central

	Proposals	Date Published	Housing and Urban Form	Water and Sanitation	Transport	Energy	Economic Development	Social Infrastructure	Climate and Environmental Sustainability	Regional Connectivity
Multilateral & International institutions	UNDP (1)	May-24	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	X
	UN-Habitat (14)	May-24	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	X
	UNCT (22)	Sep-24	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	X
	RAND (4)	Mar-25	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	X
	The Arc (15)	Apr-05	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	✓
Professional – technocratic coalitions	Gaza Neighbourhood (13)	Oct-25	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	✓
	Anthedon (6)	Nov-24	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	✓
	Al Habtoor (16)	Feb-25	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	✓
	BOT (24)	Jun-24	0	2	2	2	2	2	0	✓
	Gaza Phoenix (17)	Nov-24	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	✓
	Green Vision (27)	Oct-24	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	✓
Palestinian-led	Rebuilding Gaza (30)	Mar-26	0	2	0	2	2	2	2	X
	Imagine Gaza (9)	Oct-25	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	✓
	Gaza Phoenix (3)	Dec-24	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	✓
	Palestine Emerging (5)	Apr-24	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	X
	Connected Gaza (7)	Apr-16	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	✓
	Day After (29)	Sep-24	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	X
	Al-Shabaka (18)	May-24	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	✓
State and regional bloc	New Horizon (19)	Mar-24	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	X
	MDLF (31)	Feb-25	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	✓
	Gaza Recovery (2)	Nov-25	2	3	2	2	2	3	2	✓
	Arab League (21)	Mar-25	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	✓
	Path Forward (34)	Feb-24	0	2	2	2	2	2	0	✓
	Wilson Center (11)	May-24	0	2	2	2	2	2	0	✓
	Mitvim (25)	Mar-24	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	✓
	Humanitarian Plan (33)	Mar-24	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	X
	Gaza Futures (32)	Feb-24	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	✓
	INSS (12)	Apr-24	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	✓
	Peace to Prosperity (10)	Jan-20	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	✓
State and regional bloc	GREAT (26)	Aug-25	2	2	2	2	3	2	0	✓
	Board of Peace (9)	Feb-26	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	✓
	MIND (8)	Feb-24	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	✓
	FutureGaza (23)	Aug-24	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	✓

Figure 7: Sectoral Engagements Heatmap

The two Phoenix plans (3, 17) come closest, framing reconstruction as a social process not just a physical one. They emphasise rebuilding within existing communities, a returning to their old neighbourhoods, local labour participation and community governance of decisions. Thus reconstruction is a mechanism for restoring social bonds and collective agency.

Climate and Environmental Sustainability

Most plans treat sustainability very much as secondary to stabilisation and growth. The environment is background rather than governing constraint, though substantive content exists in several explicitly green proposals that recognise Gaza's ecological precarity. There are three main approaches: immediate environmental health and debris management; a component of build back better resilience tied to infrastructure upgrades; and those that centre decarbonisation, the circular economy and ecological design.

UNDP's (1) priorities are rubble removal, safe waste management, mitigation of public health risks, and restoring environmental services. Gaza Neighbourhood (13) incorporates environmental constraints through parcel suitability and service proximity, treating liveability and service restoration as conditions for return rather than climate concerns. For the Gaza Recovery (2) and Humanitarian Plan (33) environmental health is risk management and safe service restoration, whilst RAND (4) treats environmental planning as a core condition of interim settlements, with planned drainage and infrastructure layouts that avoid the long-term environmental degradation typical of camps. Palestine Emerging (5) frames sustainability as part of economic self-sufficiency, emphasising renewable energy transition and productive systems that reduce dependency, so water and energy are climate-relevant sectors. Anthedon (6) ties the environment to coastal identity and public realm regeneration, but like others in the technocratic and redevelopment cluster, has very limited climate adaptation content. Al Habtoor (16) assumes but does not meaningfully engage with ecological constraints, and BOT (24) treats environmental issues merely as components of infrastructure finance and delivery.


Phoenix (17) is stronger on sustainability, foregrounding rubble recycling into building materials, circular economy design and renewables-powered decentralised systems. Ecological reconstruction is part of justice-oriented recovery. Green Vision (27) is as explicit, with reconstruction a transformation primarily driven by renewables, energy efficiency, climate-adaptive design, water reuse and environmentally integrated urban planning. Gaza Phoenix (3) integrates resilience and environmental repair into neighbourhood reconstruction, whilst MERI (28) addresses environmental sustainability only indirectly, with debris removal, waste handling and sanitation-related risk reduction through its focus on municipal capacity. Rebuilding Gaza (30) actually puts environmental constraints and long-term habitability over other factors, framing sustainability through sovereignty and aquifer protection, and warning against extractive, donor-led reconstruction that ignores Gaza's ecological limits. MDLF (31) highlights environmental health risks from waste, rubble and service collapse. Gaza Recovery (2) at least has environmental upgrading as part of infrastructure and housing reconstruction programmes. The various state and policy-oriented proposals sometimes refer to sustainability and resilient infrastructure but generally have no real climate framework.



Financing

Financing Gaza’s reconstruction is a central issue, and several mechanisms for it are advanced in the plans, from pooling humanitarian funding and state-led trust funds to commercial concessions, better mobilising Palestinian diaspora capital, green transition investment and return-based investment (mainly real estate). The institutional cluster are donor-funded. UNDP (1) seeks pooling, as does the UN-Habitat (14) and Gaza Neighbourhood (13), which sees neighbourhood sequencing prioritised. UNDP (1) does too, tying it to phased recovery, so potentially allowing for other financial instruments afterwards. RAND (4) appears to see its interim housing and redevelopment similarly paid for by multilateral funding, though the pre-war Arc (15) had a wider long-term state-building palette with a regional investment framework that implied large-scale capital mobilisation tied to infrastructure corridors.

Figure 8: Financing Architectures



Financing is more explicitly dealt with, and diversified, in the technocratic and redevelopment-oriented cluster. Palestine Emerging (5) for example seeks to use diaspora capital, cooperative economic structures and regional investment partnerships to support productive sector growth. It brings private investment through a Palestinian Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as a Palestinian-led offshore vehicle to align international donors and blend in private investment.

Connected Gaza (7) also emphasises private sector infrastructure-led investment, as do Anthedon (6) and Al Habtoor (16), which rely heavily on real estate development logic, assuming returns from tourism, logistics, and commercial property.

BOT (24) has the most detailed financing model, as the name suggests with its concessions to attract private operators to finance, construct, and manage infrastructure, before transferring it to public authorities. Phoenix (17) links financing to circular economy production, renewable energy systems and local capacity building rather than mega-project investment, and Green Vision (27) similarly sees financing coming from green investment in the transition to climate-aligned infrastructure with its long-term sustainability gains.

Of the other Palestinian plans, Gaza Phoenix (3) ties financing to rights-based reconstruction and local labour mobilisation, emphasising accountability and institutional rebuilding rather than capital flows, while MERI (28) relies on targeted donor funding (for municipal machinery). Rebuilding Gaza (30) cautions against donor-driven frameworks that entrench dependency, preferring unspecified financing structures that respect sovereignty and long-term autonomy. New Horizon (19) also assumes donor financing, tied to planned redevelopment, as does MDLF (31) channelled through municipal systems. The PA (2) is perhaps the most structured state-led financing framework, with donor pledging conferences, centralised coordination and large capital allocations across sectors. Imagine Gaza (9) introduces an unconventional financing mechanism, through the “Gaza 2035” voluntary 0.3% levy on international oil and gas transactions, designed to fund long-term reconstruction and linking Gaza’s recovery to global energy markets. This leans into Gaza reconstruction as a broader international responsibility.


The Arab League (21) plan would set up an international trust fund, led by Arab states, leveraging coordinated multilateral backing. Peace to Prosperity (10) proposes large-scale international investment packages, using grants to crowd-in private capital. GREAT (26) explicitly structures financing through investment vehicles designed to attract institutional capital. Like others, it emphasises private sector investment. However, only Connected Gaza (7) maps private investments spatially, as well as emphasising sovereignty. The Board of Peace (9) primarily relies on foreign direct investment and private capital for real estate. MIND (8) and FutureGaza (23) rely on capital-intensive redevelopment financing through public-private arrangements.

Governance

Governance means different things in different plans, spanning humanitarian coordination, municipal strengthening, centralised state-led reconstruction, participatory local control, security-conditioned oversight, and investment-driven redevelopment authorities. It is one of the clearest axes of divergence, ranging from simple humanitarian harmonisation to transitional administrative bodies, the Palestinian state and a wide variety of oversight models, in some cases composed of external or technocratic control arrangements.

UNDP (1) operates within existing UN coordination mechanisms and is based on partnership with Palestinian institutions, while relying on multilateral governance structures to manage aid flows and sequencing. Gaza Neighbourhood (13) is explicitly technocratic, with data-driven parcel prioritisation under coordinated institutional oversight instead of political decision-making. UNCT (22) has governance by humanitarian coordination platforms, assuming Palestinian institutional participation, but focusing on service delivery. For UN Habitat (14) governance is settlement-level for planning and RAND (4) acknowledges that interim housing and neighbourhood redesign requires decisions but does not set out any authority, unlike the Arc (15), which seeks unitary governance consolidation across Palestine.

Figure 9: Different Governance Models Proposals



Palestine Emerging (5) emphasises Palestinian agency and liberation-oriented governance structures tied to economic autonomy. Connected Gaza (7) is based on private sector mobilisation within structured regulatory environments. Anthedon (6) and Al Habtoor (16) imply a strong centralised planning authority that is state-backed and investor-driven, but rests with redevelopment management. BOT (24) similarly has governance through concessionary arrangements, where private operators manage under contractual oversight. Phoenix (17) has participatory democracy and locally-accountable governance embedded in reconstruction. The Humanitarian Plan (33) emphasises restoring administrative functionality for service delivery and Green Vision (27) has governance aligned with sustainability and community engagement. Gaza Phoenix (3) centres local municipalities and civil society as key actors in reconstruction decision-making.

MERI (28) has an even stronger focus on the municipalities, as does MDLF (31). Day After (29) proposes transitional governance arrangements linked to Palestinian Authority structures through phased institutional reform, and Gaza Recovery (2) is similarly under the PA, with dedicated committees and coordination mechanisms. New Horizon (19) also assumes coordinated national oversight. Rebuilding Gaza (30) is explicitly critical of externally-imposed governance and emphasises rights-based, accountable Palestinian leadership.



National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG)

Governance is a primary issue for the regional plans. The Arab League (21) has a transitional Gaza Administration Committee operating under PA leadership with coordinated Arab and international backing. Path Forward (34), Gaza Futures (32) and Day After (29) condition reconstruction on demilitarisation and security restructuring and imply technocratic or internationally-supervised governance models. Mitvim's (25) has oversight arrangements to stabilise governance before full autonomy. Peace to Prosperity (10) also has an externally-backed governance, tied there to economic conditionality. GREAT (26) puts decision-making in the hands of the financial oversight vehicles managing reconstruction funds, similar to MIND (8) and FutureGaza (23), which assume a strong centralised planning authority to implement spatial and economic restructuring. The Board of Peace (9) has established the technocratic Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).

Conclusions

There are 4 main types of plans. The first is about humanitarian stabilisation, concentrating on restoring minimum functionality across housing, water, energy, transport, health and education, with a focus on debris removal, network repair and reactivating essential services so the displaced can return. The second are state-led public works approaches, broadly centralised efforts to coordinate large-scale infrastructure projects such as ports and power plants as engines of recovery. Here, reconstruction can be a mechanism for state-building and institutional consolidation. Both types depend on external funding. The third type is investment-led, with Gaza a site for master-planned districts, logistics corridors, tourism infrastructure and real estate, using public-private partnerships, concessions, trust funds or international investment platforms: reconstruction catalyses economic transformation by mobilising external capital. Finally, there are autonomy and resilience-oriented rebuilding plans, which are decentralised, with local production and community-based governance, often also those with rubble recycling, cooperative labour structures and renewable energy. With these, reconstruction is not only physical rebuilding but also the opportunity to rebuild productive capacity and reduce dependency.

The depth of detail in the plans varies significantly. Energy systems, ports and large infrastructure is often elaborated in considerable technical detail, frequently with financing and delivery mechanisms. Housing is uneven: sometimes deeply integrated into spatial planning frameworks, sometimes a downstream outcome of infrastructure investment. Healthcare and education are widely acknowledged as essential sectors, but rarely structurally reimagined beyond facility rehabilitation. Mental health services, long-term institutional reform and social protection systems receive very limited attention outside a small number of rights-oriented proposals. Climate and environmental sustainability are weighty only in a smaller subset of proposals.

Centralisation is a recurring pattern, with various reconstruction authorities, international trust funds, transitional administrative bodies or other external oversight mechanisms. There are alternative decentralised approaches, with municipal governance, community participation or distributed infrastructure systems. Financing architectures mirror this divide,



with most reliant on pooled donor financing and international, public-private partnerships, concessions or foreign direct investment. A smaller group emphasise diaspora capital mobilisation, locally-anchored production and labour-driven reconstruction. Each structure has distinct implications for political control, accountability and long-term economic dependency. Similarly, the plans lead to different territorial futures for Gaza, with some largely restoring Gaza to its pre-war spatial configuration, but others changing density, restructuring coastal areas or embedding Gaza in regional trade corridors and logistics networks. For a small group, reconstruction rebuilds sovereignty through infrastructure, production and institutional autonomy. Thus, this is not only a technical process but a mechanism to define governance arrangements, economic systems and territorial order.

There are gaps. Long-term fiscal sustainability receives limited attention, with most plans just assuming open-ended capital inflows. Very few demonstrate how infrastructure, municipal services and public institutions are to be financed and operated over time. Institutional capacity is also unevenly addressed, with the existence of administrative bodies able to coordinate large-scale reconstruction programmes too easily assumed. Few examine the staffing and legitimisation of governance institutions after such prolonged conflict and fragmentation. Social recovery is also underdeveloped: housing and infrastructure do not automatically create social cohesion, civic institutions or deal with widespread psychological trauma. Community restoration, trauma-informed services and the rebuilding of everyday civic life are largely lacking, as is environmental sustainability, beyond the limited subset of plans which articulate climate strategies to address water scarcity, coastal vulnerability, energy transition and long-term ecological constraints. Finally, accountability and transparency mechanisms are also insufficiently specified. Reconstruction funds, investment platforms and infrastructure programmes do not generally have equally-detailed governance structures for oversight, monitoring, and public accountability. A more integrated approach is needed, combining immediate recovery needs with long-term institutional and economic viability.

References

A full list, review and analysis of the 34 plans, and a methodological note is available on the online annexe here, [Gaza Reconstruction Plans Annexe](#). Thinking Portland briefs are prepared as part of the Portland Trust's work to develop long-term, sustainable economic growth in Palestine including in Gaza's future. The online version of this note is available here, [Gaza Reconstruction Plans Publication](#).

No. Reference	Plan Title	Housing and Urban Form	Water and Sanitation	Transport	Energy	Economic Development	Social Infrastructure	Climate and Environmental Sustainability	Financing Mechanisms
		EMERGENCY STABILISATION		EARLY RECOVERY		TRANSITIONAL/INTERIM		STRUCTURAL RECONSTRUCTION	
1	UNDP Gaza Early Recovery Programme Primary Sector Focus Social Infrastructure	Does not propose a new urban form or spatial redesign, prioritises debris clearance, stabilisation of damaged neighborhoods, and tracing return where feasible. Temporary shelter solutions and site servicing supported, but permanent housing reconstruction largely deferred to later phases. Urban planning return recentral.	Strong operational focus on restoring water wells, pumping stations, wastewater networks, and solid waste systems, emphasises rapid rehabilitation to prevent public health collapse. Supports municipal-level service reactivation rather than regional WASH redesign return recentral.	Priorities reopening roads through debris removal to restore mobility, humanitarian access, and municipal service circulation. Focuses on clearing and rehabilitating damaged local roads rather than proposing strategic transport restructuring.	Supports repair of electricity distribution networks and temporary power solutions for critical services (water, hospitals, municipal facilities). Energy frames as functional restoration, not systemic transformation.	Employment-intensive debris removal and cash-for-work programming central, supports SMEs and early livelihood recovery to stabilize household income. Economic framing is short- to medium-term stabilization rather than structural transformation.	Restores basic functionality of health centers, schools, and municipal buildings, focuses on reactivating service delivery systems rather than redesigning social infrastructure quickly. Education and health treated as stabilization pillars.	Incorporates "build back better" language and debris management protocols, addresses environmental and public health risks (waste, contamination), but climate adaptation and long-term ecological redesign are not core pillars.	Funded through multi-donor UN pooled mechanisms, embedded within UN Country Team coordination architecture. Financing structures as programmatic early recovery envelope (5.32B multi-sector), not investment-led or PIF-based, no new sovereign financing structure proposed.
14	UN-Habitat - Human Settlements Programme (HSP) Primary Sector Focus: Housing and Urban Form	Central focus. Frames reconstruction through area-based neighborhood recovery, housing damage assessment, land management, and spatial planning support to municipalities. Emphasises participatory planning and settlement upgrading rather than wholesale urban redesign.	Treated as essential urban rehabilitation framework but does not provide engineering-level infrastructure blueprints.	Addresses local road rehabilitation as part of area-based recovery, not a regional transport restructuring proposal.	Indirectly addressed through settlement rehabilitation and service restoration, no energy transition strategy.	Frames economic recovery through local labor engagement and housing-led recovery, livelihoods embedded in neighborhood rebuilding rather than macroeconomic reform.	Treats schools, clinics, and community facilities as anchors of neighborhood recovery, emphasizes social cohesion and inclusive planning processes.	Explicitly integrates resilience, environmental risk reduction, and land-use planning as required, climate adaptation present but not transformative.	Primarily donor-funded UN programming, technical assistance and implementation support model, no sovereign financing architecture proposed.

- Reconstruction needs to adopt a phased recovery framework that links humanitarian stabilisation to long-term development. There needs to be a bridge from relief to recovery to reconstruction, from emergency service restoration to long-term redevelopment visions. Credible reconstruction pathways require clear sequencing from debris clearance to neighbourhood rebuilding, infrastructure modernisation and structured economic recovery. Otherwise, most of Gaza risks being trapped in humanitarian management while a few disconnected redevelopment schemes are advanced.

- Effective reconstruction governance requires legitimacy that can only come from meaningful local participation and institutional accountability. Centralised reconstruction authorities or externally-administered funds must have governance structures with public trust, through municipal institutions, civil society participation and transparent oversight mechanisms.

- Reconstruction financing mechanisms are crucial, but require transparency, accountability and long-term operational sustainability. Financial frameworks must incorporate clear governance structures, monitoring mechanisms and provisions for long-term operation and maintenance to prevent infrastructure degradation and fiscal dependency.

- Long-term economic recovery depends on leveraging external investment to build local productive capacity. Capital-intensive infrastructure projects, tourism development and real estate investment can generate growth, but sustainability requires its modality to be through revitalising local industries, the construction sector, agriculture and small enterprises to sustain employment and so reduce dependency and recreate a (connected) domestic economy.

- Environmental sustainability is a structural constraint, not an optional design feature. Water scarcity, coastal vulnerability, energy insecurity, and environmental degradation are both clear and present dangers and long-term challenges for Gaza, so strategies need to integrate renewable energy systems, water reuse, resilient infrastructure design and circularity to support sustainable recovery.

- To be resilient, reconstruction must incorporate social recovery to counter trauma. Physical infrastructure alone will not restore the social fabric disrupted by prolonged violence and displacement. It needs added community participation, neighbourhood return, and accessible public services that rebuild social trust, together with copious psychosocial support. Schools, healthcare facilities and public spaces should all anchor this community restoration.